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PRIVATIZATION AND THE "PRIMARILY
RELATED" TEST: A CASE FOR
CLARIFICATION
MARK HAZELBAKER*
DAVID C. HERTEL**

The recent adoption of a program allowing a small number of poor parents to send their children to private schools in Milwaukee has renewed
interest and debate surrounding the decade-long controversy centering on
privatization and delivery of public services by private providers.
The enormous controversy generated by this program and the strength
of opposition posed by unionized public school teachers1 is the latest instance of the clash between the public's interest in selecting the best method
of delivering municipal services and the private interests of employees in
continuing their employment.
What are the interests at issue in the Milwaukee School Choice Program
(MSCP) and privatization in general? And, to the extent that privatization
is a valid way of meeting the public's need for governmental services, does
Wisconsin law make it a viable option for municipalities? This Article will
examine limitations now found in Wisconsin's public sector labor law
known as the Municipal Employment Relations Act (MERA).2 We conclude that future efforts to improve public services by use of private providers, such as the MSCP, will be fatally hampered by the expansive manner in
which the employer's duty to bargain basic decisions has been defined in
existing doctrine created under MERA. To the degree that Wisconsin law
leads broader national trends, these limitations may be of national
significance.
© 1991 by the Authors
* Former Corporation Counsel, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin. Currently an associate at the
firm of Axley, Brynelson, Madison; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School, 1982. Member,
State Bar of Wisconsin.
** Shareholder, Whyte & Hirschboeck, S.C., Milwaukee; J.D., University of Wisconsin
School of Law, 1977. Member of the Wisconsin and Arizona bars.
1. The school choice program was challenged in court by several special interest groups attempting to prevent the program from starting. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals issued a decision
temporarily halting the program on the grounds it was a local law which was improperly included
in the 1989 executive budget bill. Davis v. Grover, 159 Wis. 2d 150, 464 N.W.2d 220 (Ct. App.
1990). The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, sustaining the validity of the
program. N.W.2d 220 (Ct. App. 1990).
2. Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (1989-90).
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THE SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAM: PRIVATIZATION
OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

The MSCP represents both an admission of the failure of public schools
and a lack of hope that continuation of the public school monopoly3 can
ever lead, by itself, to a quality education for minorities. Created at the
instance of State Representative Annette Polly Williams, 4 the MSCP5 applies to children living in households whose incomes are 1.75 times the poverty line or less.' Total participation is limited to no more than one percent
of the school district population.7
The MSCP comes in response to a widespread perception of a crisis in
the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS).8 The school system, battered by social problems in the deteriorating central city of Milwaukee, has struggled
to maintain an educational program in the face of urban realities such as
crack cocaine, teenage pregnancy, and chronic delinquency. Because the
MSCP gives parents the opportunity to have their children educated at public expense in a private school, the program represents a classic example of
3. The MSCP is not the first program allowing parents to choose the school to which their
children will be sent. It is, however, unique in that it allows parents to send their children to
private schools at public expense. Other school choice experiments have allowed choices to be
made only among public schools.
4. Rep. Williams blurred ideological distinctions by making her proposal. A two-time
chairperson of the Wisconsin presidential campaigns of Jesse Jackson, Ms. Williams' strong support for privatization of education endeared her to an odd admixture of conservatives and minority advocates. Columnist William Raspberry, an African-American commentator on social issues,
described the paradox:
Williams and Patrick are black, and it matters. As long as white conservatives were the
driving force behind vouchers, tax credits and other choice mechanisms, the mostly liberal
education establishment found it easy to discredit them as not really interested in the education of poor children but only interested in their own arcane doctrines.
No such charge can stick against Williams, an inner-city single mother who twice
headed the Rev. Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign in Wisconsin. Her interest, she
insists, is not in undermining public schools but in educating poor black children. They
aren't being educated now, she says, because the school hierarchy has been more interested
in perpetuating its own power and promoting racial integration. Like Patrick, her goal is
not to empty the public schools but to force them to improve.
William Raspberry, Blacks Shift Hope to School 'Choice" WIS. ST. J., July 22, 1990, at 21 A.
5. The School choice program was created in 1989 by Wisconsin Act 336, §§ 25, 228, 2332.
It is codified in Wis. STAT. § 119.23 (1989-90).
6. Wis. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)l (1989-90).
7. Id.
8. Representative Williams described her concern about the public school system as follows:
We have to be saved from our saviors. Our liberal friends have built their whole lives
around taking care of us and they still want to feed us with pabulum. At some point, we
want real food. We want to make our own decisions whether our liberal friends like it or
not.
Teachers vs. Kids, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1990, at A14.
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privatization.9 The same governmental service is being provided and the
same responsibility is still being met. The government, however, is no
longer the provider of the service, it is only the financier.10
The MSCP includes a provision requiring private schools to demonstrate quality in their programs by proving that they meet at least one of

four criteria." Private schools failing to satisfy any of the criteria are ineligible to enroll pupils in the MSCP.
While the State does impose a host of standards that public schools are
required to meet in order to obtain state aid, 2 the schools are not required
to prove affirmatively that they have complied with these standards. In
theory, a local public school's state aid can be withheld for failure to meet
these standards, but the decision to do so is at the sole discretion of the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 3 The superintendent is not required to suspend state school aid even when a public school blatantly fails
9. Indeed, this unique feature of the Milwaukee School Choice Program aroused the strongest
resistance. Morris Andrews, Executive Director of the Wisconsin Education Association Council,
wrote in a special pamphlet issued by WEAC on school choice:
We believe the concept of parental choice transforms public education into consumer
purchasing where the parent becomes the consumer, the student becomes the product and
the teacher the technician. Schools become subject to the whims of the marketplace, as
defined by individual parental preferences, rather than working to meet the needs of all
students.
WISCONSIN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION COUNCIL, SCHOOL CHOICE 4

(1990).

10. The Legislature appropriated a sum sufficient to make necessary payments for the program. WIs. STAT. § 20.255(2)(fu) (1989-90).
11. The criteria are:
A. At least 70 percent of students advance on grade level each year.
B. The school's average attendance rate is at least 90 percent.
C. At least 80 percent of the students demonstrate significant academic progress.
D. At least 70 percent of the families of pupils in the program meet parental involvement criteria developed by the school.
Wis. STAT. § 119.23(7)(a) (1989-90).
12. See, eg., WIs. STAT. §§ 118.01, 121.02; WIS. ADMIN. CODE § PI 8 (Feb. 1991).
13. The incumbent State Superintendent of Public Instruction strenuously opposed the
School Choice Program. He went so far as to invite litigation to overturn it. In a statement released to the press, Superintendent Herbert Grover stated:
For all practical purposes, the private schools that are targeted to receive the funds authorized by this legislation are subject to no effective controls or standards related to pupils
whose education is funded by the state. As private schools in Wisconsin, they are not
subject to the educational standards that apply to public schools. There is nothing in the
legislation that directly requires the schools to be certified or the teachers employed to have
any training in the education process itself or in particular disciplines or subject areas.
Thus, there is no way of assuring that state funds earmarked for the education of our
children will be accomplishing the intended purpose.
I am pleased that the legal issues have been raised in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. I urge
the Court to address these issues as soon as possible.
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to meet a state performance standard.14 In essence, the public school system can keep operating, year after year, without meeting defined goals or
children's needs.
By contrast, under the terms of the MSCP, only schools that affirmatively demonstrate that they can meet one of four specific criteria can retain
their public scholarship students. Thus, the State and municipality have
neither ownership of the private school program nor an investment (emotional or fiscal) in the operation. The State's role changes from senior partner in an enterprise that directly provides the service to that of an objective
purchaser of educational services, able to distinguish between programs
which work and those that do not, and to discontinue purchasing the services of the latter.
The driving force behind the privatization movement is precisely this
enhancement in accountability." Advocates of privatization point out that
it is hard for government to deal with a bureaucracy that has grown over
time. Discharging incompetent employees is believed to be much more difficult in the public sector 16 given the existence of entrenched employee unions able to take advantage of grievance arbitration before the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission (WERC). 7 In addition, constitutional
due process rights make it hard to fire even nonunion public employees.1
The concept of privatization is based on faith in competition-the ability to
select the best of several providers vying for an opportunity to sell their
Statement of State Superintendent Herbert Grover, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau (June
1990).
14. Wis. STAT. § 121.006 (1989-90). In an interview with one of the co-authors, Wisconsin
Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction Roger Sundby, whose duties included oversight of
state school aid programs, stated that the State Superintendent has never suspended a school
district's state aid for failure to meet state standards. Interview with Roger Sundby, Wisconsin
Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction in Madison, Wisconsin (June 1991).
15. Clint Bolick, Director of the Landmark Legal Foundation's Center for Civil Rights in
Washington, D.C., argued in an editorial in the Milwaukee Sentinel:
The public school monopoly has had more than its share of chances to provide quality
educational opportunities for economically disadvantaged children. The time is long overdue to try something different.
What terrifies the establishment is the one innovation that makes this program truly
radical: the transfer of power from educational bureaucrats to parents. And what that
means is, for the first time, public schools will have to compete for low-income students.
Clint Bolick, Choice: A Breakthroughfor Low-Income Kids, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Aug. 15,

1990, at 14.
16. HENRY H. PERRiT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 323-65 (2d ed. 1987).

17. Wis. STAT. § 11l.70(4)(c)(2) (1989-90).
18. See, eg., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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services to a government buyer. Needless to say, the concept is strongly
opposed by public employees. 19

Not surprisingly, the Milwaukee School Choice Program has engendered tremendous controversy, a pattern seen nationwide when school
choice programs are considered. As has happened nationally, the issue has
divided the public and political leaders along unusual lines. Liberals tend
to oppose school choice even though they generally favor maximizing indi-

vidual liberties.2'

Some conservatives, who ordinarily argue for greater reli-

ance on the private sector, part company when the issue is school choice.2 1
The debate surrounding the MSCP echoes previous debates on priva-

tization of other local government services. The interests at stake are similar. Proponents of school choice are in the position of service consumers.
Dissatisfied with the results of the services, proponents seek to use the polit19. There is a large volume of work prepared by advocates for and against privatization. A
good example of literature in opposition to privatization is Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun.
Employees, Passing the Bucks: The Contracting Out of Public Services (1983).
20. The Madison Capital Times, a leading liberal voice in Wisconsin, editorialized against
school choice, stating the proposal tears at the fabric of society. The Capital Times wrote:
In the midst of all the whoops of joy this week from proponents of the idea that public
dollars ought to pay for the education of students in private schools, listen for the quiet
sound of the social fabric of this nation tearing.
If the private school choice is expanded in years to come - and there is certainly a
push in that direction on both the state and the federal level - this means that the more
expensive and challenging job of educating youngsters with disabilities will be left to the
public schools. It also means that children in private schools will have less exposure to the
diversity of people in this society. Hear that fabric tearing?
School Choice Tears at Fabricof Society, Wis. ST. J., Aug. 12, 1990, at 10 A.
21. William Kraus, iconoclastic Chief of Staff to former Wisconsin Governor Lee S. Dreyfus,
wrote in opposition to the Milwaukee School Choice Program, characterizing the program as "the
skimming of public education." In a column printed in The Capital Times, Kraus stated:
Let us concede at the outset that public education doesn't work well everywhere, doesn't
work at all in some places. Let us concede that monopolistic bureaucracies do need some
shaking up and a competitive free market is often an effective vibrator. Let us also concede
that the fact that [Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Instruction] Bert Grover is connected at the hip to Morrie Andrews and his Wisconsin Education Association, and Morrie's agenda may not be quite as altruistic as we all hope Bert's is, is a cause for concern if
not alarm. Let us concede as well that public education is not doing all the things we assign
it half as well as it thinks it is or as we think it should.
A lot of things need fixing.
The important thing now is to make sure there is a viable, universal public education
institution for the next generation to improve. If we strip public schools of the students
who make it whole and as good as it can be, a lot of things will become academic, including
education.
William Kraus, We Must Stop Stripping Our PublicSchools, THE CAPITAL TIMES, July 29, 1990,
at 5 A.
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ical process to change the way services are provided. The goal of educating
all children remains the same. However, the means desired to achieve this
goal change radically. Opposing these voices of consumerism, labor organizations representing school teachers and employees have formed a marriage
of necessity with school superintendents more accustomed to fighting it out
with these employees. Whatever their past differences may have been,
teachers and superintendents alike are threatened by school choice programs. This is not to suggest that either side is acting solely out of selfishness. Clearly, all involved ultimately advocate for the best interests of the
children-quality education. However, getting to that point is highly
problematic.
In fighting proposed privatization of municipal services, municipal employees in Wisconsin enjoy a powerful position.2 2 They often have political
muscle resulting from being represented by well-organized, politically active unions.2 3 They also have the protection of a well-settled body of case
law concerning privatization. The remainder of this Article will review the
development of Wisconsin law and privatization in an attempt to show that
replicating the MSCP or any other privatization plan will be very difficult
or impossible as the law now stands in Wisconsin with respect to a public
employer's duty to bargain.
THE DUTY To BARGAIN WITH UNION EMPLOYEES

From the very beginning of statutorily recognized collective bargaining
in the United States under the National Labor Relations Act,2 4 one of the
most difficult conceptual issues in developing labor law has been the scope
of mandatory bargaining. Collective bargaining has embodied, from its inception, an evolving balance of weighing employees' economic interests and
power against employers deploying and re-deploying their capital.

22. The Wall Street Journal,commenting editorially on the Milwaukee program, characterized the issue as "Teachers vs. Kids." The Journal commented:
The time has come to ask just whose side the teachers' unions, school bureaucracies and
some civil rights groups are on: their own or the kids who endure the dismal state of
education in some many parts of this country. In Wisconsin, the answer is becoming very

clear.
There, officials of the state's largest teacher union and officials of the NAACP are suing
to have the nation's first experiment in school vouchers for low-income children declared
unconstitutional. If they win, the losers will be hundreds of inner-city children who expect
to attend a school of their own choosing in September.
Teachers vs. Kids, supra note 8, at A14.
23. See infra note 75.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1990).
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In the American system of labor relations, the determination that a particular matter is a mandatory, as opposed to a permissive, subject of bargaining leads to restrictions on an entrepreneur's presumptive freedom to
control operations or to redirect investment.2 5 Consequently, defining the
scope of the duty to bargain has been no easy task.2 6 Indeed, a black 7letter
2
definition has eluded the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
When collective bargaining spread into the public sector, beginning with
Wisconsin's pioneering MERA,2 s there arose an entirely new and different
dimension to the problem of balancing the interests of labor and management. In the private sector, the tension was between the interests of employees in their wages, hours, and conditions of employment, versus the
"core of entrepreneurial control"2 9 which is the heart of a market economy.

But, in the public sector, management was driven by a different constraint
25. It is important to note the divergence between private and public sector labor law with
respect to mandatory subjects. In the private sector, the employer is required to bargain a
mandatory subject to the point of impasse-where neither party is willing to make further concessions. At that point, the private employer is free to unilaterally impose the employer's final offer.
The union can strike in an attempt to coerce the employer to back down.
By contrast, in the public sector employers are required to bargain mandatory subjects, but are
prohibited from unilaterally implementing their positions when impasse is reached. Instead, disputes over mandatory subjects are resolved by third-party interest arbitration. Statistics compiled
by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission in 1984 showed that unions won 50.6 percent of arbitrations, employers 49.4 percent. Collective Bargaining, 52 THE WISCONSIN TAXPAYER 8 (1984). Given a situation in which employees have an even chance of prevailing by going
to arbitration, the employer has much less control or power than exists in the private sector. In
private sector labor disputes, the employer can bargain to an impasse. If the employer is willing to
accept an employee strike, the employer can implement its final offer. The private sector employer
is allowed to permanently replace striking employees. In Wisconsin municipal employment relations, however, management cannot implement its final offer unilaterally. Interest disputes must
be resolved through final binding arbitration. WIs. STAT. § 111.70 (4)(cM) (1989-90); see Collective Bargaining, 52 THE WISCONSIN TAXPAYER 8 (1984).
26. A "mandatory subject of bargaining" is a matter which concerns the wages, hours, and
conditions of employment of union employees. Under sections 8(a)5 and (d) of the National Labor
Relations Act, employers are required to bargain in good faith with their employees toward agreement on these matters. Employers cannot make changes in matters subject to the duty to bargain
without first attempting to negotiate changes with the union. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
27. With respect to the kinds of major business decisions which would be involved in privatization (i.e., subcontracting, relocation, partial closings, leasing, etc.), the terminology used as the
standard to define what should be a mandatory subject has evolved slowly and not without confusion. The standard has changed from an initial phraseology that employer decisions which lie "at
the core of entrepreneurial control" should be non-mandatory to a concept that employer decisions which "turn on labor cost" should be mandatory subjects of bargaining. See, e.g., First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Fibreboard Paper Prod. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203 (1964); Dubuque Packing Co., 303 NLRB 66 (1991); Otis Elevator Co., 269 NLRB 891
(1984).
28. The Wisconsin Municipal Employment Relations Act was first created by Chapter 509,
Laws of 1959, and has been substantially revised since then. See WIs. STAT. § 111.70 (1989-90).
29. See Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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the will of the people. Thus, where private sector labor disputes fell into
a more quantifiable (and in the eyes of some, Manichaean) struggle between
labor and management, public sector bargaining pitted employees' desires
to influence their working conditions against the public's right to govern
itself.
As happened earlier in the private sector, the standards for mandatory
bargaining have evolved in the public sector. Wisconsin, the first state to
adopt statutes recognizing public sector collective bargaining,30 has contributed a number of interesting cases in its struggle to rationalize union selfinterest with the public interest. A review of these cases will show that
Wisconsin has attempted to follow the lead of federal labor law in defining
the duty to bargain. Unfortunately, the development of federal law in this
area has been based on the entirely different set of economic realities found
in the private sector.
Wisconsin's case law defining the scope of the duty to bargain passed
through an initial period in which the supreme court interpreted Wisconsin
Statutes section 111.70 to lend guidance to both parties involved in the bargaining process and the WERC. The first product of this definitional stage
was the "primarily related" standard initially described in Beloit Education
Ass'n v. WERC,1 which is discussed at greater length below.
Venturing beyond the initial stage of definition, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals have now decided several cases
which, by applying the "primarily related" standard, have defined the parameters of the duty to bargain and have identified the policy considerations
deemed significant. Useful as these cases are, the emerging issue of privatization poses a new conceptual challenge, one to which the "primarily related" standard, as now stated, seems at best irrelevant and at worst a fatal
obstacle to a valuable option for elected policy makers.
"Privatization" may be implemented by any of several creative strategies to reduce or contain the cost of government by transferring public serv-

30. While Wisconsin was the first state to adopt legislation legitimizing collective bargaining
with public employees, many other states have acted since 1959. Several states, notably Oregon,
Massachusetts, and Hawaii, have public sector laws similar to Wisconsin. See, e.g., HAW. REv.
STAT. § 89-3 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. ISOE, § 2 (West 1982); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 43.656 (1989).
31. 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976). The test defines a matter to be a mandatory
subject of bargaining if it relates more fundamentally or basically to the interests of employees in
their wages, hours, and conditions of employment than to the interests of employers in managing
the enterprise. The test, in essence, requires weighing the significance of each party's interest in
the outcome of negotiations on a given issue. The interests which seem to the determining party to
be the most significant will prevail. Quite evidently, more than a small amount of subjectivity is
present.
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ices or operations to private sector management. The legal device utilized
may be, for example, a sale, subcontract, purchase of services, or sale/leaseback. The essential element is the substitution of nonelected managers who
enjoy both freedom from political micro-management and flexibility to
meet service demands effectively. The conceptual underpinning of privatization, one which is far from universally accepted,3 2 is that private sector
managers can provide services more efficiently and effectively than their
public sector counterparts. Advocates see privatization as a panacea for the
multiple inadequacies of government.33 Opponents, on the other hand, revile privatization as an unmitigated disaster.3 4 The truth lies somewhere in
between.
It is probably accurate to say that there are some services that a given
private sector manager can operate more efficiently and effectively than can
public sector leadership. The purpose of this Article is not to engage in the
debate over the merits of privatization of any particular service; that has
been richly explored elsewhere.35 Rather, our purpose is to question
32. See, e.g.,

JOHN

D.

HANRAHAN,

GOVERNMENT FOR SALE: CONTRACTING OUT-THE

NEW PATRONAGE (1977).

33. A typical quote from the hagiographic literature endorsing privatization is the following
excerpt:
Perhaps the ultimate symbol of the worldwide trend toward privatization took place in
December in Bucharest. Just days after the overthrow of the Ceaucescu dictatorship, students at the Bucharest University conducted a demonstration. Their demands? Neutrality,
a bill of rights, and a stock market. Bucharest hotel staff stopped work to demand immediate privatization.
The wholesale rejection of socialism in Eastern Europe was the most dramatic of the
many, continuing shifts away from government production of goods and services and toward a greater role for the private sector during 1989. Around the world, another $25
billion in state-owned assets were sold to private enterprise in 1989, bringing the total
figure for the 1980s to some $185 billion.
Virtually no government function is exempt from being considered for privatization. At
year-end, Britain's Ministry of Defence announced that it would be seeking bids from universities and colleges for taking over the academic functions of the famed Sandhurst military academy.
REASON FOUNDATION, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON PRIVATIZATION: PRIVATIZATION: 1990,
5 (1990).
34. A representative critical excerpt from the polemic John D. Hanrahan:
When businesspersons say, 'Private enterprise can perform government services more efficiently than public workers,' they too often are not displaying civic-mindedness, but are
rather seeking additional legalized raids on the public treasury. Public employees are being
made scapegoats for the current problems of state and local governments, and some of the
leaders of the anti-public employee chorus are businessmen who are trying to get their
hands on more government dollars through lucrative contracts.
HANRAHAN, supra note 32, at 9.
35. HANRAHAN, supra note 32 (arguing against privatization). See generally 4 PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, THE PRIVATIZATION REVIEWV (1989) (arguing in favor of privatization); JOHN
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whether it is possible to implement any privatization decision under the
present "primarily related" standard that defines the scope of the duty to
bargain in the Wisconsin public sector. We also discuss whether such an
option should exist as a matter of sound public policy.
For the reasons developed herein, the "primarily related" standard
needs modification to be viable in dealing with the emerging challenge of
privatization. In order to explore the issue, we will first review the evolution of the scope of the duty to bargain under MERA. Although MERA
has been the law since 1959, it was not until 1976 that a case turning on the
scope of the duty to bargain under that statute was decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
In Beloit, the WERC was called upon to resolve a "prohibited practices" complaint filed by the Association alleging that the Beloit School District unlawfully refused to bargain a number of issues, including class size.
The union had submitted a number of proposals which would have greatly
reduced the school board's prerogatives in managing the district. Resisting
the proposals, the district contended that many of them were not properly
resolved through contract negotiations, but rather, were best decided in the
public policy process.
In reviewing the WERC's decision on the individual proposals, the
court formulated a standard to be used as the touchstone for evaluating
issues as mandatory or permissive subjects. The court's decision crafted a
standard out of the language of Wisconsin Statutes section 111.70 (1)(a)
(1989-90). The court focused on the sentence of subsection (1) that reads in
part:
The employer shall not be required to bargain on subjects reserved
to the management and direction of the governmental unit except
insofar as the manner of exercise of such functions affects the wages,
hours and conditions of employment of the employees.
In formulating the standard, the court did not develop a test which
tracked economic realities of the employer-employee relationship. Instead,
it simply reviewed and supplemented the terms used in the "primarily related" test adopted by the WERC. Referring to a dictionary, the court concluded the term "primarily" meant "basically" or "fundamentally."
The court reasoned that the statute requires a balancing of the interests
of the employer against those of the employee. If, on balance, the subject
appears to relate more fundamentally to the interests of the employees in
their wages, hours, and conditions of employment, the subject is a
D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS (1989) (giving a
thorough and balanced analysis of privatization).
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mandatory subject of bargaining. If, however, the balance is struck the
other way and the subject appears to basically or fundamentally involve the
management and direction of the municipal employer-the will of the people as manifested through their elected officials-then the subject is
permissive.
This distinction is extremely important in collective bargaining and public administration. Once a subject has been found to be a mandatory subject of bargaining, the matter must not only be bargained for with
employees at their demand, but it also cannot be unilaterally altered without the prior agreement of the employer and employees. Obviously, public
employees gain tremendous leverage whenever a matter becomes a
mandatory subject of bargaining.3 6 In the public sector, an employer can
implement only proposals that the employer can persuade either the union
or an arbitrator to approve.
The preclusion of the public sector management and, indirectly, the
electorate from acting unilaterally poses the central challenge in the public
sector. Recognizing that challenge, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has attempted to accommodate our society's high premium on self-rule.
Two cases, decided in the 18 years since Beloit, are illustrative of the
implications and application of the "primarily related" standard for school
choice programs or privatization in general. Read together, these cases define the duty to bargain concerning reassignment of work by the public sector. First, case law came down that arguably subjected virtually any
reassignment of work from public to private employees to the duty to bargain. Somewhat later, a case was decided holding that a public employer
may take unilateral action to terminate public services. Since school choice
and other privatization programs will inherently involve reassignment of
work from public to private employees, these cases are illustrative of the
current legal framework with which school choice programs will have to
contend.
THE RACINE CASE:

A

CHANGE IN MEANS, NOT ENDS, IS
BARGAINABLE

In 1973, the Racine Unified School District decided to subcontract its
food service program for student lunches in order to save money. The district contracted with a private vendor to provide food service. The operation remained essentially the same, except that food service employees of
the school district were laid off and became employees of the private ven-

36. Wis.

STAT.

§§ 111.70(3)(a)(4), (5) (1989-90).
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dor. The vendor was obligated to provide food service to the district's students. The union representing the displaced food service workers
commenced a prohibited practice complaint3 7 alleging the district unlawfully refused to bargain the decision to substitute the private food service for
the former public food service, in violation of Wisconsin Statutes section
3
111.70 (3)(a)(4) (1989-90). 8
The WERC found that the district committed a prohibited practice and
ordered the subcontract arrangement undone. In Racine Unified School
District v. WERC,3 9 the Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the WERC's
result, but on different legal grounds. The WERC had sought to apply the
test used in the federal law to define the duty to bargain, which at the time
was a "basic directions" test, applied in Wisconsin by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Libby, McNeil and Libby v. WERC,4 a private sector
Wisconsin case arising under the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act." The
court rejected the WERC's approach. The court rejected the private sector
standard which rendered subcontracting a mandatory subject of bargaining
on the grounds that the nature of municipal employment relations was far
different from that of the private sector. To the court, some issues that
would be mandatory subjects of bargaining in the private sector had to be
permissive in the public sector to accommodate the political process. As
the court stated:
In the private sector, collective bargaining is limited by the need to
protect the 'core of entrepreneurial control,' particularly power over
the deployment of capital. If resources are to be employed efficiently
in a market economy, capital must be mobile and responsive to market forces... Libby, therefore recognized the importance of the employer's ability to 'change the direction' of his enterprise, and to
redirect his capital.
Different concerns are present in the public sector, however, and
the 'change of direction' test is not responsive to those concerns. In
37. Under the Wisconsin MERA, the term "prohibited practices" is used in lieu of "unfair
labor pr ctices." WIs. STAT. §§ 111.70 (1)(m), (3), (4)(a) (1989-90).
38. It should be noted that when the Racine case arose, there was no interest arbitration
provision under the Wisconsin MERA. Ironically, the employer might have been able at that time
to achieve the subcontract it sought by bargaining to impasse on the subject and implementing its
final offer. See 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 178 (amendment establishing interest arbitration provisions in
Wisconsin).
39. 81 Wis. 2d 89, 259 N.W.2d 724 (1977).
40. 48 Wis. 2d 272, 179 N.W.2d 805 (1970).
41. Wis. STAT. § 111.01 (1990). It should be noted that the WEPA applies only to private
sector employers whose operations are not engaged in interstate commerce. Since Libby, the
NLRB has expanded its jurisdiction to include virtually any private employer in the United
States.
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the public sector, the principal limit on the scope of collective bar-

gaining is concern for the integrity of political processes.
In municipal employment relations the bargaining table is not the
appropriate forum for the formulation or management of public pol-

icy. Where a decision is essentially concerned with public policy
choices, no group should act as an exclusive representative; discussions should be open; and public policy should be shaped through

the regular political process. Essential control over the management
of the school district's affairs must be left with the school board, the
body elected to be responsible for those affairs under state law.42
Applying the "primary relationship" standard as established in Beloit,
the court nonetheless found that the school district acted unlawfully by sub-

contracting its food operations without first bargaining with its employees
because the effect of the district's decision was primarily on the wages,
hours, and conditions of employment of the employees, not on the district's
services or policies. District food services remained, as before, delivered by
means of a contract requiring the same services to be provided. The major
changes were in the benefits and wages of employees. The court wrote, "the

same work will be performed in the same places and in the same manner.
The services provided by the district will not be affected." 4 3 Thus, the Ra-

cine case established that a municipal employer cannot unilaterally subcontract a service to reduce the cost of the service to the governmental unit
unless it first meets its duty to bargain. Where a decision has no impact on
the governmental services provided by the municipality, the decision's impact on the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of the employees
makes it subject to bargaining.
The Racine case is not surprising to students of federal labor law. After
all, the employer's decision appeared on the record to implicate neither the
"core of entrepreneurial control" standard relied on by the WERC nor the
more modern NLRB standard, 44 which looks to whether the decision was
motivated by labor costs. Clearly, the Racine Unified School District
neither redeployed its capital assets nor sought to do anything other than
reduce labor costs. To the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the decision did not
appear to involve the "management and direction" of the district at all, but
only the means by which the district achieved unaltered goals. The state of
the law after Racine was that public employers cannot unilaterally change
the means by which public services are provided. Such decisions are subject
42. Racine, 81 Wis. 2d at 99-100, 259 N.W.2d at 30.
43. Id. at 102, 259 N.W.2d at 732.
44. Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984).
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to the approval of the employees; the only way a proposal can be imposed
involuntarily is through binding interest arbitration.45 Considering that the
heart of school choice programs is making the very decision which was at
issue in the Racine case, its holding appears to be a serious, if not a fatal,
obstacle.
A case arising with different facts a few years later carved out the only
area for public management discretion, namely, deciding on the "ends."
Examination of this case will further illustrate the limitations of the current
"primarily related" test.
THE BROOKFIELD CASE: CARVING OUT A
ROLE FOR THE PUBLIC PROCESS

In 1979, the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined a narrow zone of discretion for municipal employers in the case of City of Brookfield v. WERC.4 6
Brookfield involved a decision by the City Council of Brookfield to hold
down property taxes by laying off five firefighters. The firefighters' union
filed a prohibited practice complaint, alleging that the city could not lay off
the firefighters without first bargaining the decision with their union. The
WERC agreed, ordering the city to reinstate the firefighters and bargain
with the union before laying off firefighters. The Waukesha County Circuit
Court reversed the WERC. The Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently
affirmed the circuit court, holding that the subject of layoffs was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining.
The court in so holding noted initially that the statutes authorized the
city to reduce its firefighting force. The court further noted that the city's
home rule power to determine its local affairs gave the city the presumptive
right to make the decision at issue. The court then considered whether the
city's presumptive power to reduce its firefighting force could be exercised
unilaterally, or only as a result of agreement in the collective bargaining
process. The court observed:
To decide the issue to be a mandatory subject of bargaining would
destroy the equal balance of power that insures the collective bargaining rights of the union and protects the rights of the general
45. The official statistics on interest arbitration suggest that employers and employees each

prevail roughly 50 percent of the time. However, the raw statistics are not the full story. The
prevailing arbitral policy in Wisconsin municipal interest arbitration is that arbitrators will only
rarely and with great reluctance impose changes in contract language or working conditions on
employees. See, eg., Manitowoc Police Dep't Employees, Local 731, WERC Dec. No. 26003-A
(Oct. 18, 1989) (arbitrator refused to support the city's demand for a nominal employee contribution to the cost of health insurance).
46. 87 Wis. 2d 819, 275 N.W.2d 723 (1979).
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public to determine the quality and level of municipal services they
consider vital.4 7
The court, in discussing the balance of equities involved, noted that the
union had made a conscious effort to lobby the common council against the
proposed layoff. The court quoted from one of the political leaflets targeted
at the Brookfield Common Council by the union, which made the point that
policy decisions affecting employees can be, and often are, influenced by the
political efforts of the employees. This opportunity to influence policy decisions gives unions a chance to counter even those decisions that are not
mandatory subjects of bargaining. The political rights of public employees
give them some measure of power to offset the broader managerial prerogatives of municipal employers. Indeed, public employees enjoy the unique
position of being able to control not only the position of their union as to a
given labor-management issue, but also to influence the management position. Taking that factor and the language of the statute into consideration,
the court struck the balance in favor of the employer, stating, "We hold
that economically motivated layoffs of public employees resulting from
budgetary restraints is a matter primarily related to the exercise of municipal powers and responsibilities and the integrity of the political processes of
municipal government.""a
As a result, Brookfield, on its face, establishes an important policy
which is highly relevant to the discussion herein: the integrity of the democratic process requires giving a governmental body the power to make a
unilateral decision to forego the benefits of the services of public employees
through an economically motivated layoff without first bargaining that decision with those employees. This result was not limited to cities by the
language of Brookfield. The history of the case since 1979 shows that the
holding is not narrowly confined to home rule cities. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied the holding of Brookfield, which it stated in a later
case to be "that a budgetary layoff decision is not a subject of mandatory
bargaining"'4 9 to other units of government. In West Bend, the Brookfield
holding was used in the context of a school district. School districts, like
counties, townships, and vocational, technical, and adult eduction districts,
are creatures of statutes and have no home rule powers.
Thus it is apparent that the holding in Brookfield did not result from the
fact that the city enjoyed home rule, rather, it resulted from the fact that
the city was responsible to the will of the electorate. The essence of the
47. Id. at 833, 275 N.W.2d at 730.
48. Id. at 830, 275 N.W.2d at 728.
49. West Bend Edue. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 357 N.W.2d 534, 538 (1984).
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Brookfield case is that the people, acting through their elected representatives, must be free to reduce the level of municipal services without being
restricted by collective bargaining. The Wisconsin Supreme Court identified and valued for the first time the interests of municipal employers in
determining whether a subject was mandatory or permissive. These interests, the court held, should be weighed in determining whether a given issue
is primarily related to the management and direction of a municipal employer or to the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of the
employees.
After Brookfield, it became clear that the interests on the public employer's side were nothing less than the need to accommodate the political
process of self-rule. Where the political process decides to forego the benefits of a service, the managerial dimensions of the issue predominate, regardless of the implications for the affected employees. Conversely, in the
case of decisions by employers to subcontract work or otherwise seek to
maintain public services using substitutes for bargaining unit employees, the
managerial or policy dimension has been viewed by the WERC and court as
minimal. They have regarded the decision involved as not altering the services provided by the employer, but only the manner in which they are
provided.
Therefore, Brookfield has carved out only one narrow area of privatization that is viewed by the court and WERC as, on balance, predominantly
managerial in nature and therefore not a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Recently, a series of cases involving the emerging trend toward privatization have raised a substantial question concerning the validity of such measures in protecting the integrity of the political process. They squarely
present a conceptual problem that could not have been addressed in the
seminal cases that have produced the current "primarily related" test. To
the extent that privatization is a useful tool for municipal employers, these
cases show why the test should be re-examined.
These cases are of great significance and relevance for proponents of
school choice programs. They highlight the extent to which current case
law, by frustrating the discretion of municipal employers, in effect ends up
frustrating the political process. The inevitable result of the existing case
law is a serious impediment to the future of school choice programs.
THE WAUKESHA, CHIPPEWA, AND MANITOWOC COUNTY CASES:
PRIVATIZATION MEETS THE "PRIMARILY RELATED" TEST
Several Wisconsin counties have recently undertaken the same effort involved in school choice programs-transfer of an ongoing public service to
private management and operation. The transfer involved privatization of
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fiscally troubled county nursing homes. These cases provide useful precedent on both the legal and political level. As legal precedent, they have
further defined the law of privatization in Wisconsin. As political case
studies, they document the strength of the political process in grappling
with difficult, emotionally charged issues about how we serve special and
vulnerable members of our society. The fervor attendant to discussions of
care for the elderly is already being replicated in the debate over the education of children.
The legal issues related to privatization have been most vigorously
joined recently in several cases involving county nursing homes. Wisconsin's counties own fifty-two homes licensed under the Wisconsin Administrative Code5 0 These institutions are successors to a system of county
institutions which have existed for more than a century. The fifty-two
county nursing homes, though constituting only one-ninth of Wisconsin
nursing homes, house more than one-seventh of the State's nursing home
residents. They also serve a highly disproportionate share of the State's
skilled care and Medicaid residents. County nursing homes evolved .from
institutions founded in the 19th century as county homes for relief of the
needy, an institution for which statutory reference still can be found in Wisconsin Statutes section 49.14 (1989-90). County homes were typically located on a county farm which produced the food eaten by the home's
residents. The homes were started to provide relief to the poor, operating
on the belief that it was unwise and immoral to support the poor in the
community. 1 County homes for the poor have been supplanted by general
relief payments under Wisconsin Statutes section 49.02 (1989-90).
As this century began, however, the counties began to open what proved
to be their most durable institutions, the county mental hospitals. These
institutions, funded by state and local taxes, cared for thousands of men50. Wis. Admin. Code § HSS 132 (1990). These figures are derived from Wis. DEPT. OF
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES, WISCONSIN NURSING HOME DIRECTORY AND FACT BOOK

(1990).
51. Nineteenth century Americans feared that making relief too attractive by dispensing it in
the community would encourage shiftlessness and immorality. In consequence, counties developed homes to provide "indoor" relief for children and women who were not expected to work.
For able-bodied men, the program was called "outdoor" relief because relief was earned through
hard labor on county roads, forests, or institutions. An excellent historical analysis of the rise of
county homes and other eleemosynary institutions in the United States is found in DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (Little Brown) (1971).

MARQUETE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:451

tally ill patients5 2 in the era before revolutionary anti-psychotic medications
made community treatment and support of the mentally ill a reality.5 3
Even as those community alternatives began to emerge in the early
1970s, Wisconsin, however, followed the lead of other states by adopting
legislation mandating re-licensure of all county mental hospitals as nursing
homes.14 The State's decision turned former mentally ill patients into nursing home residents-garnering hundreds of millions of dollars of federal
medical assistance as the result. 5
Medical assistance, however, proved to be a fiscal nightmare for the
State in the late 1970s. Wisconsin was not alone in that experience; it affected every state and the federal government. By 1980, the burden of paying medical assistance providers for the cost of serving patients had become
more than the federal government wished to bear. Senator David Boren of
Oklahoma successfully promoted an amendment to 42 U.S.C. section 1396a
(13)(A) (1980), requiring states to reimburse medical assistance providers
only the amount "that an efficiently and economically operated" facility
would need to deliver services.56 The change in federal law allowed the
states to cap reimbursement at the rates charged by the providers at the
60th percentile of costs. The State of Wisconsin implemented the federal
law by amending Wisconsin Statutes section 49.45.57 The county nursing
homes found themselves, generally, with high costs that were mostly the
result of high patient care standards, high labor costs, and little or no additional reimbursement for those costs.
With medical assistance serving as the major source of revenue for
county nursing homes and the State unwilling to pay the counties their
costs of providing services, the result was, predictably, that the counties
experienced substantial operating deficits. With revenue increases averaging less than one-fourth of cost increases, the gap between income and expenses widened annually to the point where counties reported deficits
totalling $31 million in 1986. There was little prospect of major relief given
the fiscal constraints limiting the State's resources.

52. Linda Reivitz, The Future Of County Nursing Homes, WISCONSIN COUNTIES, Nov. 1986,
at 7.
53. Community support programs for the mentally ill are provided for by Wis. STAT.
§ 51.421 (1990).
54. 1973 Wis. Laws 90, §§ 241, 540m; 1973 Wis. Laws 333 § 104.
55. See Chad McGrath, County Homes Outstanding, WISCONSIN COUNTIES, Dec. 1983, at
13.
56. Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2650 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)).
57. 1981 Wis. Laws ch. 20 §§ 839-854 (1981).
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Looking at large deficits, while at the same time fearing large federal cut
backs from the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Reduction Act, 58 counties began to actively consider leaving the nursing home business. In 1986,
consideration ended and decisions were made in three counties-Waukesha, Chippewa, and Manitowoc.
Waukesha County was experiencing an annual operating deficit of $1
million while confronting a need to reconstruct its inefficient and outdated
nursing home building. Rather than accept those consequences, the county
decided to sell the going concern in its nursing home to a nonprofit corporation created by two local hospitals and lease the home's building until the
nonprofit corporation could construct its own new facilities. Chippewa
County, experiencing annual operating losses in excess of $1.5 million, decided to sell its nursing home, building, and operations. The sale was financed with a forty-year land contract. Manitowoc County, advised by an
outside financial consultant that its Park Lawn Home would likely run deficits in excess of $350,000 per year, approved an agreement under which it
sold the nursing home operation to a private for-profit operator and leased
the home's building.
All three decisions were bitterly opposed by the affected employees. After political mobilization failed to stop the counties from acting, the unions
involved fied prohibited practice complaints. 59 Each complaint alleged
that the county acted unlawfully in unilaterally deciding to sell or lease
their nursing homes.
An interesting aspect of the three complaints is that they probably never
would have been filed had the employers involved been subject to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). After all, private concerns frequently
sell all or part of their businesses. Absent some explicit anti-union motivation, the decision by an employer to sell is generally not a mandatory subject of bargaining under the NLRA. °
With a different statute, of course, the complaining unions sought to
establish a different result. The focus of the unions' arguments was the
Racine case, where the court had held that a change in the means by which
services were provided, which did not change the level of the services, was a
mandatory subject of bargaining.

58. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985).
59. Local 2490 AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Waukesha County, WERC Dec. No. 24110-B

(March 29, 1988); Local 913, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Manitowoc County, WERC Dec. No.
23591-A (Feb. 19, 1986); Local 2236, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Chippewa County, WERC Dec.
No. 24521 (May 28, 1987).
60. Local 2179, United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB., 822 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1987).
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In each of the three sales, the union argued, the nursing home which
had been sold continued to operate as a nursing home. Although no subcontract or other provision required the new owners to operate the nursing
homes at any particular level of service, the unions argued that the counties
had entered into arrangements with the same result as a subcontract continuation of the prior service. Because the counties were selling a highly
specialized asset supported by third-party revenues and regulated by the
state, the unions argued that the sales amounted to a constructive
subcontract.
On review, the unions' contention was rejected by both WERC and the
Wisconsin courts. The dispositive element in the three cases was the absence of any requirement that the new owner of each home continue to
operate the facility at all, let alone at any particular level of quality.
The first decision came in the Waukesha case. There, as in the two
other cases, the union filed both a prohibited practices complaint under
Wisconsin Statutes section 111.70(5) (1989-90) and a civil action seeking an
injunction to prevent the sale from happening. Since Wisconsin Statutes
section 111.07(1) (1989-90), gives the circuit courts and the WERC concurrent jurisdiction over allegations of prohibited practices, the Waukesha local union went to the circuit court to obtain injunctive relief that the
WERC could not give summarily.
Waukesha County decided that it preferred the forum of the circuit
court and, relying on the statutory provision giving the court concurrent
jurisdiction, asked the court to hear the merits of the prohibited practices
complaint. The court agreed and granted the county's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the county's decision to sell Northview Home was
not a mandatory subject of bargaining.6" In so deciding, the court relied on
the Brookfield case. The circuit court's decision holding that the decision
was not a mandatory subject of bargaining was not appealed. The county
then moved the WERC to dismiss the union's complaint case, a motion the
62
WERC granted on the ground of resjudicata.
61. In granting the county's motion for summary judgment, Judge Willis J. Zick held: "It
then becomes pretty clear that this is a total divestment of any involvement by the county in this
operation. They have sold all this stuff and sold - basically their licenses, and so on, is really
what they sold, I guess. And they leased this building." Transcript of decision, Local 2490,
AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Waukesha County, Case No. 86-CV-3597 (March 30, 1987) (Waukesha
County Circuit Court).
62. Local 2490, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Waukesha County, WERC Dec. No. 24115-B
(March 29, 1988).
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Soon after Waukesha was decided, the WERC issued its decision in
Chippewa County.6" There, the WERC ruled that the decision to sell a
nursing home was related to the level of services of the county where there
was no contractual mandate that the home continue to operate or serve the
residents of the county. The WERC stated that it viewed the Brookfield
case as standing for the proposition that a county need not bargain over
such a "level of services" decision.
In the third decision, after an examiner's decision that Manitowoc
County should have bargained the decision to lease Park Lawn Home," the
full WERC reversed, holding that the lease was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining.6" Again, the WERC relied on the holding in Brookfield. The
Commission explained its rationale:
Here, the record demonstrates that Section 5.01 of the lease does
not limit the use of the leased facility to the operation of a nursing
home but rather permits use for any lawful purpose. The lease does
not contain a requirement that the lessee give any preference to
county residents if it continues to operate the premises as a health
care facility.... Under these circumstances, and where, as here, the
term of the lease is of sufficient length so as to satisfy us that the
transaction does indeed represent a bona fide decision to cease providing the services in question we conclude that Manitowoc County
did indeed get out of the business of being a health care provider
through the instant sale/lease transaction. Under Chippewa County
and our understanding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision
in City of Brookfield, the County need not bargain over such a 'level
of services' decision despite the substantial impact on employee
wages, hours and conditions of employment. 6
The union appealed the WERC decision to the Manitowoc County Circuit Court, which affirmed the WERC position on November 4, 1988. In
turn, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court in an unpublished decision in June 1989. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the union's petition for review, letting the WERC decision stand.
Finally, proving the biblical adage that the first shall be last and the last
first, in late 1990, Chippewa County won a published court of appeals decision upholding the WERC's finding that there was no duty to bargain the
63.
64.
65.
66.

WERC Dec. No. 24521 (May 28, 1987).
WERC Dec. No. 23591-A (Feb. 19, 1987).
WERC Dec. No. 23591-B (Feb. 29, 1988).
Id.at 13 (emphasis added).
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sale of a county nursing home.6 7 District III of the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals assessed Chippewa as follows:
In the present case, the county surrendered all control of the physical plant and operations of the center when the sale to Heyde was
completed. They retained only the interest of a secured party in a
land contract. No other rights were reserved to the county as a result of this sale. The union argues that the operation continues essentially as before (except for the center's relationship with its
employees). While Heyde has continued the operation, that fact
represents only his management decision as to the operation of this
center and not proof of a subcontracting relationship between the
county and him. It is clear that power is vested in Heyde and that
he is under no obligation to run the center in any particular way or
to offer any particular services as a result of his purchase of this
property. The commission specifically found that the control of the
operation of the center did not remain directly or indirectly with the
county. In the absence of such a finding, no subcontractual relationship exists between these parties.68
Since the employers won these three cases, it may appear that they establish a way for municipal employers to consider and implement privatization. However, none of the cases involved the central assumption about
privatization - that a private concern operates a continuing public service
on behalf of a unit of government. In each of the cases discussed above, the
employers prevailed precisely because there was no evidence of intent to
privatize the nursing homes. Indeed, in each case, the municipality painstakingly structured the transaction to avoid any implication of an obligation
to continue the nursing home's operations.
As the decisions in each of the three cases made clear, it was the absence
of contractual provisions making the private vendees the agent or alter ego
of the county which allowed the commission and courts to find that the sale
did in fact alter the services provided by the county. Given the restrictions
in the current understanding of the "primarily related" test, it is inconceivable that any of the counties would have prevailed had they actually privatized the nursing home in question. The essence of privatization is, after all,
that through a contract the public continues to derive benefits from a par67. Local 2236, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. WERC, 157 Wis. 2d 708, 461 N.W.2d 286 (1990).
The Chippewa case took longer to wind through the system because the first decision issued by the
WERC failed to satisfy Circuit Judge Gregory Peterson, Eau Claire County Circuit Court. Judge
Peterson felt the original decision did not adequately display exercise of administrative discretion
and remanded the case. On remand, the Commission affirmed its holding but expanded upon its
reasoning.
68. Id. at 716, 461 N.W.2d at 289-90.
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ticular service-the service is simply provided through a private contractor.
It is exactly the continued assurance of public benefits which makes the
privatization arguably bargainable under the Racine case.
The complaining unions argued that proof of less than a formal subcontract was sufficient. The unions argued that any reasonable prospect of continued public benefits demonstrated the transactions were intended to
maintain services through private operators, and, therefore, the cases fell
within the ambit of Racine. To the unions, the sales or leases by the counties were constructively subcontracts because the economics and legal realities of the sales made it highly likely that the nursing homes would continue
to operate inthe counties as nursing homes.
The cases came down to fine points. In each case, the employer successfully demonstrated the absence of any formal obligation by the new home
owner to continue to operate a nursing home, let alone to serve the county's
residents. Absent some formal requirement, the employers argued that the
continued operation of the homes could not be imputed to the counties.
That argument succeeded in persuading the WERC and courts that the
employers had made a bona fide decision to reduce their levels of service as
sanctioned by the Brookfield case.
Therefore, the nursing home cases show that it is permissible for a municipal employer to unilaterally decide to discontinue a particular service by
transferring it to a private concern, but only if the employer is willing to
completely forego control over that service and have no assurances the service will be continued in the future. This harsh limitation of current law
shaped the nursing home decisions, forcing the counties to forego any provisions which would have assured continued quality of health care for the
homes' residents. The absence of such a requirement gave rise to heated
political rhetoric. Proponents of sales were characterized as indifferent to
the needs of the elderly. As in the Brookfield case, the employers prevailed
because they were willing to make the extreme sacrifices involved-sell the
homes with no assurances as to their future operation.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS

Quite clearly, any attempt by a school district to privatize all or part of
its school operations through a school choice program will run headlong
into the announced case law under MERA. The counties that privatized
their nursing homes succeeded in doing so only because those institutions
were capable of operating on their own as proprietary institutions without
continuing financial support, management, and control from the county.
Schools, of course, are radically different. They are a governmental service and have classically been deemed a public good, one whose benefits
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cannot readily be withheld from anyone.6 9 While the goal of universal free
education originated by Horace Mann7 is beyond debate, the means to attain that end should be debatable. Under current Wisconsin law, the public
has but one choice to educate its children without paying tuition - the
public school monopoly.
It is a safe assumption, if school operations cannot be privatized without
permission of the affected employees, that privatization will never happen.
The only circumstances under which privatization has been found permissible under the existing "primarily related" standard are when it is not truly
privatization at all.
It can be seen that true privatization is impossible in a recently reported
case involving a municipal employer, Brown County, which more overtly
attempted to privatize a local service. That county decided to lease the
building formerly occupied by its juvenile shelter care home, contracting
with a private provider to purchase similar services. The county employees
who had provided the youth home services were laid off in the process.
The employees and their union charged Brown County with refusing to
bargain in violation of Wisconsin Statutes section 11 1.70(3)(a)(4) (1989-90).
The WERC found that Brown County had unlawfully refused to bargain
and ordered the county to reinstate youth home services, offer reemployment to the employees and make them whole for lost wages and benefits.
The circuit court upheld the WERC's finding that the county had a duty to
bargain with respect to its decision to privatize the operation of the youth
71
home.
In other words, but for the fact that the MSCP is a special legislative
initiative that arguably overrides the dictates of MERA,7 2 the initiative's
very existence would depend on the grace of the school employees. The
69. A good can be classified as a public good if its consumption is necessarily shared by all
members of a community. The existence of public goods is an important justification for governments to engage in some form of economic activity.
A principle of nonexclusion applies to public goods, in two senses: (1) because one person's use
of the good does not interfere with or exclude another person's use, and (2) because it is impossible to exclude any member of the community from benefiting from the good.
See WERNER SICHEL and PETE ECKSTEIN, BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS 236 (1979).
70. See JONATHAN MESSERLI, HORACE MANN 340-43 (1st ed. 1971).
71. Brown County v. WERC, 138 Wis. 2d 254, 405 N.W.2d 752,petitionfor rev. denied, 140
Wis. 2d 873, 416 N.W.2d 66 (1987).
72. This is an assumption based on the doctrine of harmonization of statutes which on their

face, are in conflict. There is authority for the proposition that the later statute controls over a
prior law. In re Frederick's Estate, 247 Wis. 268, 19 N.W.2d 248 (1945). However, one could well
argue that the School Choice Program law does not relieve the Milwaukee Public Schools of their
duty to bargain the decision to transfer children to the private sector. See, e.g., Glendale Professional Police Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 264 N.W.2d 594 (1978) (holding that the
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only way a school district could privatize part of its program would be to
divest itself of all control over the operation - an abdication of responsibility which would be not only politically untenable, but constitutionally
doubtful.73
This leads to the ultimate question: Did the legislature intend to grant
municipal employers the power to act unilaterally only where the locality
decides to completely abandon its responsibilities? Or did the legislature
intend the political process to have the power to determine how best to
provide local services?
In adopting the Racine holding, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said it
was rejecting federal law on subcontracting in order to arrive at a broader
range of discretion for local employers. If the issue before a municipal employer is privatization, however, the supreme court's intention has not been
realized. Privatization would seem, ultimately, to be a choice about quality,
accountability, and efficiency-values that are classic choices that the democratic process should make. Under current law, there is no choice that can
be made about it at all.
PRIVATIZATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

The Racine holding assumes that a decision by local elected officials to
contract out a service does not primarily relate to the level or quality of
services provided by the municipality. Actually, the decision to privatize a
service has far-reaching consequences for the services themselves. For
every perceived benefit of economy, flexibility, and efficiency, there are at
least as many offsetting disadvantages of loss of direct control and potential
for monopoly power on the part of the contractor. Privatization is a difficult choice to make even without considering the labor relations implications. There will always be sacrifices when a municipality transfers an
operation from public to private management. 74
The Racine holding assumes that decisions about the means by which a
goal is to be reached are unimportant. Experience suggests quite the oppo-

MERA takes precedence over the police chief's power to appoint police officers under Wis. STAT.
§ 62.13. Certainly any impact on the public school teachers would be bargainable.
73. The Wisconsin Constitution provides: "The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall
be free and without tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 2 0 years... ." WIS. CONST.
art. X, § 3.
74. Indeed, the thrust of opposition to privatization from public employees is precisely the
claim that private services are very different in character-and inferior-to services directly provided by the municipality.
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site; that whether a given public policy goal is attainable at all depends on
the means selected to attain it more than anything else.
These considerations appear to have been given short shrift by the Racine court, perhaps because the record before it showed little evidence of
any trade-offs weighed by the school district in making the decision to contract out the school lunch program. But even if we evaluate the Racine
holding in light of the facts of that case, the policy result remains
inadequate.
The law of privatization cannot be decided in isolation from the remainder of the labor relations system. Yet, that is precisely what happened in
Racine, where the supreme court rather uncritically accepted the same result as would have been obtained in the private sector under a straight subcontract. The problem is that we are not dealing with a private sector
employer.
The federal law on subcontracting developed in a labor-management relationship that has two major differences from the municipal employment
relationship in Wisconsin. First, private sector employers, unlike public
employees, have a legal right to impose their will on their employees. While
private sector law requires that bargaining be pursued first, a private sector
employer can implement its final offer after reaching impasse in negotiations. At this point, the union can use its strike weapon to exact a price for
the employer's action. Even then, though, private sector employers can
permanently replace economic strikers. Second, private sector employers'
management is not subject to influence or control by its employees, other
than through economic warfare. Private sector management is controlled
by the enterprise's owners. Public sector employers, however, are controlled by elected officials. Public employees vote - and have mobilized
themselves into a formidable political force.7 5
75. Figures compiled by the Wisconsin State Elections Board in its Biennial Report show the
following ranking of political action committees in total expenditures and contributions to state
candidates during 1987-88, the latest period for which information is available:
1. Wisconsin Education Association Council PAC:
$640,832.82
2. Realtors PAC
191,083.04
3. Wisconsin Bankers PAC
162,276.78
4. Wisconsin Savings Association PAC
63,079.39
5. Council of Auto & Truck Retailers PAC
57,329.90
6. Wisconsin Truck Operators (W-TON) PAC
54,878.36
7. Lawyers Active in Wisconsin (PAC)
54,608.80
8. Bane One Corporation PAC
50,465.00
9. Wis. Credit Union Legislative Activity PAC
49,022.99
10. 1st Wisconsin Civic Affairs PAC
47,877.00
The other major public employee union, the American Federation of State County and Municipal
Employees had PAC spending totalling $63,567.87 when all its related PACs are included.
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The equities and balance of power in public sector labor relations, therefore, are radically different from those found in the private sector. While
private sector employees are generally protected from unilateral subcontracting by the NLRA, their employers can ultimately implement their will
and can counter the employees' power by using economic weapons such as
the lockout or permanent replacements.
In the public sector, employees are protected from unilateral subcontracts as well. The employer, however, has no effective means to implement
a subcontracting or privatization proposal without the consent of the employees. The public employer cannot effectively press employees on the issues that are involved in and often give rise to privatization-excessive
wages and benefits. In Wisconsin, public employers cannot impose their
last offer at the point of impasse, decide to take a strike, or lock out their
employees.7 6 A strike can occur only by an agreement between the employer and the union.7 7 In thirteen years under the revised MERA, not one
legal public employee strike has occurred.
The public employer's position is even worse than this, however. Any
decision by a municipal employer to use even the limited power it possesses
under MERA is subject to political challenge by the affected employees. In
other words, employees control their own position and have a shot at controlling that of the employer.
Privatization would serve a highly valuable purpose in Wisconsin municipal employment relations by giving management an economic weapon
that could discipline the collective bargaining process. Under the current
MERA, negotiations on wages, hours, and conditions of employment go on
and on, culminating in a fantasy land where the value of an employee's
services in the real world free market is almost ignored. Instead, the negotiation and arbitration process is driven by wages, hours, and conditions of
employment relative to other public employers. 78 Naturally, such a process
is subject to manipulation by employees-an advantage they utilize.

76. Wis. STAT. § 111.76(4)(cm) (1989-90).
77. WIS. STAT. § 111.70(4)(cm)(7) (1989-90).

78. The factors considered by interest arbitrators are:
a. The lawful authority of the municipal employer.
b. Stipulations of the parties.
c. The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the unit of government to meet the costs of any proposed settlement.
d. Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the municipal employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and conditions of
employment of other employees performing similar services.
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Privatization poses a competing method of getting the job done with
operating costs based on real world market conditions. Those are the conditions with which the entrepreneur proposing to serve a municipality has
to contend. The resulting proposal to a municipality serves as a bench
mark for comparison to the costs of providing services directly. This may
be the discipline needed to help municipal employers hold down operating
costs. As property taxes continue to escalate to record levels each year despite the provision of record amounts of state funds, 9 which are supposed
to defray tax increases, serious cost containment is becoming more imperative.8 0 In the context of public education, where the welfare of the next
generation is at issue, privatization in the form of school choice programming may be a way out of the intractable mess of deteriorating quality,
uncontrolled conditions, and skyrocketing expenses being experienced in
the public schools.
Ultimately, municipal labor relations have to pass a fundamental fairness test: Are those whose employment is financed by taxation, working for
e. Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the municipal employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and conditions of
employment of other employees generally in public employment in the same community

and in comparable communities.
f. Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the municipal employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours and conditions of
employment of other employees in private employment in the same community and in
comparable communities.
g. The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly known as the cost of

living.
h. The overall compensation presently received by the municipal employees, including direct wage compensation, vacation, holidays and excused time, insurance and pension, med-

ical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity and stability of employment, and all other
benefits received.

i. Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the arbitration
proceedings.
j. Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or traditionally
taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or other-

wise between the parties, in the public service or private employment.
Wis. STAT. §§ 111.70(4)(cm)(7) (A-J) (1989-90).
79. In 1990-91, the State of Wisconsin's total budget was $11,721,213,000. Of that total,
$4,476,176,100, or 38.1 percent, was paid to school districts, cities, towns, villages, counties, and

other local governments to reduce property taxes. STATE OF WISCONSIN, BLUE BOOK 808 (199192).
80. In 1989, local units of government levied a record $4.1 billion of property taxes to be
collected in 1990. The 1989 property tax levy was an 84 percent increase over the 1980 property
tax levy. Wisconsin Taxpayers Alliance, Property Tax Levies, 58 THE WISCONSIN TAXPAYER 4

(1990).
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substantially better wages, hours, and conditions of employment than the
people who are paying taxes to finance government? Studies can determine
whether or not this is the case; giving municipal employers the power to
privatize would allow them to respond to the problem.
While the existence of the power to privatize would enhance employers'
positions, it certainly would not lead to a wholesale contracting out of government functions. Even in the United Kingdom, where consideration of
privatization was mandated by legislation enacted at the instance of the
conservative Thatcher government,8 1 local councils continue to provide
many services directly.
In Wisconsin, it is safe to assume that political pressure will do much to
prevent municipalities from wielding the power to privatize, even if it exists.
But at least the decision will be made in the proper forum - the elected
governing body. The existence of the power to privatize would give municipalities the power to set limits on how much they are willing to allow tax
dollars to provide above-market compensation to their employees. It would
also give local officials a chance to select a provider of services that can get
the job done instead of being tied to inefficient in-house operations.
If nothing else, the power to experiment or innovate may be a powerful
incentive to improve performance and motivation of government bureaucracy. The private sector has developed a plethora of creative strategies to
successfully meet the needs of consumers in the economy.
Not insignificantly, privatization will allow the elected representatives
of the public to decide whether to abandon service providers in areas such
as education where costs are considered excessive or results unacceptable.
The driving force behind privatization, therefore, is as much quality and
efficiency as economics. There may be some services which public organizations are too burdened by political limitations to effectively provide.
All of these desirable consequences of privatization, however, remain
unavailable to municipalities. The Racine court struck a balance which it
felt was even-handed, but which in practice has left municipal employers
without control over their operations. As the law now stands, a narrow
special interest group in society, unionized public employees, has virtual
immunity from real-world economic considerations.
Under the existing definition of the duty to bargain and the collective
bargaining process, quality of services, whether schools or nursing homes
81. Local councils in the United Kingdom are required by the Local Government Act of
1988 to competitively contract for six local services: refuse collection, food services, street cleaning, janitorial, grounds/building maintenance, and vehicle maintenance. Under Mrs. Thatcher,
Britain led the world in privatization efforts. See REASON FOUNDATION, supra note 33.
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are involved, is virtually irrelevant. The law of Wisconsin, as construed in
the Racine case, locks the electorate into a monopoly relationship with its
employees-a grip that no private sector employer would tolerate.
Fortunately, Racine is a case of statutory interpretation, not constitutional rights. The holding can be reversed by amending Wisconsin Statute
section 111.70 (1989-90). The Wisconsin legislature should promptly consider such an amendment. Failure to do so will result in the continued lack
of a real choice in public services.

